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Abstract 
In this article, we seek to examine the potential for cross-fertilization of legal regimes relating 
to trade union representation of members in collective bargaining. The United Kingdom has 
moved from an entirely voluntarist model in the 1980s to a statutory regime which facilitates 
recognition of a trade union following majority support from workers (usually by a ballot). 
By way of contrast, New Zealand has shifted from a highly regulated award-based model in 
the 1980s to an “agency” model whereby an employer is required to bargain in good faith 
with any union representing two or more of the employer’s employees, but with some 
balloting also contemplated for coverage of non-unionised workers. It is uncontroversial that 
the UK legislation has been severely limited in its effects in a context of ongoing decline in 
collective bargaining, while the NZ model offers only faint remediation of the dismembering 
of the collective bargaining system by the Employment Contracts Act 1991. In both legal 
systems, a Labour Party is now proposing implementation of forms of sectoral bargaining. 
We explore the reasons for these political and legal developments, exploring democratic and 
human rights rationales for their adoption, as well as more pragmatic approaches. In so doing 
we examine the scope for democratic trade union representation via consent or ballot, the role 
of individual human rights, and regulatory rationales. We conclude by considering how 
representative and regulatory approaches may be mutually reinforcing and addressing 
different understandings of “constitutionalisation”. In so doing, we reaffirm the emphasis 
placed in Gordon Anderson’s writings on substance over form. 
   
1. Introduction 
 
In this article, we consider the potential for cross-fertilization of legal regimes relating to 
trade union representation of members in collective bargaining. The United Kingdom1  has 
moved from an almost entirely voluntarist model in the 1980s to a more hybrid statutory-
voluntary regime. The legislation facilitates recognition of a trade union following majority 
support from workers (usually by a ballot), but statutory recognition is not envisaged as a 
supersession of voluntary bargaining arrangements where the parties reach agreement.  By 
way of contrast, New Zealand shifted from a highly regulated award-based model to an 
                                                          
1 The United Kingdom consists of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. We use the term 
‘British’ colloquially to refer to this full constituency.  
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“agency” model whereby an employer is required to bargain in good faith with any union 
representing two or more of the employer’s employees. It was the latter feature, analogous to 
common law contractual principles and the law of agency, which Gordon Anderson identified 
in his extensive writing on this subject.2  
 
It is uncontroversial that British legislation has been severely limited in its effects in a context 
of ongoing decline of collective bargaining coverage, while the New Zealand model offers 
only faint remediation of the dismembering of the collective bargaining system by the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991.  We examine the reasons for these political and legal 
developments, considering democratic and human rights rationales for their adoption. 
Curiously, New Zealand offers a more direct protection of the “right to be represented” often 
recognised as intrinsic to freedom of association, despite the absence of a juridified 
“constitutionalisation” framework.  
 
We then explore whether the operationalisation of this “agency” approach could supplement 
the majoritarian system adopted in the United Kingdom (also Australian and North 
American) bargaining regimes in ways that are more conducive to an inclusive ‘bottom up’ 
workplace democracy based upon strong worker mobilisation. This has the potential to 
provide legal support for “industrial strength”, which Gordon Anderson and Pam Nuttall have 
considered necessary for effective trade union representation as a basis for “voice” at work.3  
We also address the regulatory challenges posed by the recent turn towards “sectoral” 
bargaining strategies, as outlined in the recent British Labour Party Manifesto proposals4 and 
New Zealand proposals for “Fair Pay Agreements”.5 We end by reflecting upon how 
                                                          
2 Gordon Anderson, “Good Faith in the Individual Employment Relationship in New 
Zealand” (2011) 32 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 685; see also Gordon Anderson, Reconstructing 
New Zealand’s Labour Law: Consensus or Divergence? (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 2011).  
3 Gordon Anderson and Pam Nuttall, “The Good-Faith Obligation: An Effective Model for 
Promoting Voice?’ in Alan Bogg and Tonia Novitz (eds), Voices at Work: Continuity and 
Change in the Common Law World (OUP, Oxford, 2014).  
4 For the Many, Not the Few (Labour Party, London, 2017) available at: 
https://labour.org.uk/manifesto/. See at 47 and at 51, which say that Labour will “roll out 
sectoral collective bargaining”. 
5 See New Zealand Labour’s 2017 Election Platform available at: 
https://www.labour.org.nz/workplacerelations. This states that Labour will be: “Introducing 
Fair Pay Agreements that set fair, basic employment conditions across an industry based on 
the employment standards that apply in that industry.”  
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representational and regulatory enterprise-based and sector-based bargaining might be 
coordinated in an integrated system of multi-level governance in New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom, alongside how different understandings of “constitutionalisation” can be effective.  
 
2. “Representational” and “regulatory” bargaining through trade unions:  
individual right, democratic entitlement, or public governance? 
 
Keith Ewing and John Hendy have drawn attention to an important distinction between two 
different conceptions of collective bargaining.6 “Representational” bargaining is usually 
predicated upon the representation of workers’ interests through collective bargaining at the 
level of the enterprise. This form of bargaining is circumscribed in two main respects: first, 
bargaining outcomes are typically confined to the enterprise; and second, the trade union’s 
representation function is tied very closely to the authorizing consent of the represented 
workers. This decentralized “representational” model has (at various times) been 
characteristic of the United Kingdom, United States, Canadian and New Zealand models of 
collective bargaining. There are of course many important legal differences between each of 
these jurisdictions. There is however an underlying basic normative unity, which is to frame 
collective bargaining as a private market activity conducted by trade unions on an enterprise 
basis as designated agents of a tightly circumscribed bargaining unit. In turn, this 
“representational” conception is closely aligned with a consent-based model of 
representational legitimacy.  
 
By contrast, a “regulatory” conception of collective bargaining conceives of it as a public 
regulatory activity conducted at sectoral or national levels. On this view, collective 
bargaining is a mode of public governance akin to law-making. It involves trade unions in the 
public governance of employment for larger-scale geographical or sectoral constituencies. 
This may even extend to national-level social pacts. This regulatory species of collective 
bargaining is characteristic of European industrial relations systems such as those of France 
or Germany. Historically, the British and New Zealand industrial relations systems were also 
aligned with such a regulatory conception. For example, British bargaining institutions were 
supported by a range of indirect auxiliary props: machinery for ensuring the compulsory 
                                                          
6 See Keith D Ewing, “The Function of Trade Unions” (2005) 34 Industrial Law Journal (ILJ) 
1; and Keith Ewing and John Hendy, “New Perspectives on Collective Labour Law: Trade 
Union Recognition and Collective Bargaining” (2017) 46 ILJ 23. 
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normative effect of qualifying collective agreements, wages councils, fair wages clauses, 
extension of collective agreements and compulsory arbitration.7 
 
Comparative reflection on the recent trajectories of British and New Zealand law and practice 
provides some interesting perspectives on this distinction. Currently, the legal structures in 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom represent variations on these models. The NZ 
“agency” model is the purest form of a consent-based model of representational legitimacy, 
in that the trade union acts as a designated bargaining representative exclusively for its 
members. There are difficulties entailed in extending its normative effects to workers who 
have not given the union authorisation to act as their agent. By contrast, the British statutory 
“democratic entitlement” model makes provision for a democratic procedure based upon 
“majority rule”. Where the trade union representative achieves majority support in the 
bargaining unit, either through membership density or through a statutory ballot, it is 
authorised to bargain on behalf of all the workers in the bargaining unit. As we shall see, each 
of these legal models of “representational” bargaining has significant weaknesses. Having 
identified those weaknesses, we assess whether a hybrid model of “agency” and “democratic 
entitlement” might provide a more effective legal structure for representational bargaining at 
enterprise-level. 
 
We then consider the role of sectoral bargaining as “public governance”, which requires a 
different approach to representational legitimacy and regulatory effectiveness. Union 
membership density might be one relevant factor to consider in determining whether a trade 
union is representative. However, a rich variety of representational principles have been 
deployed alongside union membership density in European industrial relations systems. As 
Bruno Veneziani has observed, “there is no golden formula for representativeness, valid for 
all situations and all functions, on the European scene”.8 These criteria have often evolved 
organically over long periods of time and in accordance with the internal logics of specific 
                                                          
7 Alan Bogg and Tonia Novitz, “Recognition in Respect of Bargaining in the United 
Kingdom: Collective Autonomy and Political Neutrality in Context” in Breen Creighton and 
Anthony Forsyth (eds), Rediscovering Collective Bargaining: Australia’s Fair Work Act in 
International Perspective (Routledge, New York/London, 2012) at 227; drawing on Alan 
Bogg, The Democratic Aspects of Trade Union Recognition (Hart, Oxford, 2009).   
8 Bruno Veneziani, “The Intervention of the Law to Regulate Collective Bargaining and 
Trade Union Representation Rights in European countries: Recent trends and problems” 
(1999) 5 Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 100 at 128. 
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industrial relations systems. Factors that have been treated as relevant principles have 
included (in addition to union membership density): organizational connections to 
authoritative national confederations; alignment between the subject matter of negotiation 
and the trade union’s particular functions; and sufficient internal structures to facilitate 
democratic participation of union members.9  
 
An individual right to representation 
 
It has been powerfully argued by Hendy that the right to be represented by a trade union is a 
fundamental human right.10 He sees this as a right to be accompanied to workplace 
grievances, to be informed and consulted, but also to have access to collective bargaining by 
this means. It is well-established that there is an internationally recognised right to associate 
and to be a trade union member. Article 22, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 states simply: “Everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.” Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966 further reiterates that the States Parties undertake to ensure 
“the right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject 
only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his 
economic and social interests” (at paragraph 1). These are notably rights that apply to 
“everyone” and do not seem to be dependent on national or transnational norms concerning 
“worker” or “employment” status.11 The link between the entitlement to trade union 
membership and the promotion and protection of one’s interests is significant for the purpose 
of trade union recognition which enables effective collective representation. It seems to be 
enough that a worker has joined the trade union for her to be represented by it in matters of 
economic and social concern. Further, given the remainder of the text of Article 8 of the 
ICESCR, it is evident that trade unions are to act freely for these purposes, subject only to 
certain listed restrictions including, notably, “limitations … prescribed by law and which are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the 
                                                          
9 Ibid., 126 - 130. 
10 John Hendy QC, Every Worker Shall Have The Right To Be Represented At Work By A 
Trade Union (Institute of Employment Rights, Liverpool, 1998). 
11 See Valerio De Stefano, “Non-standard Work and Limits on Freedom of Association: A 
human rights-based approach” (2016) 46 ILJ 185. 
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protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. Indeed, in many respects this text mirrors 
that of Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which is binding 
on the United Kingdom as a ratifying signatory, having scope for domestic implementation 
by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998.  
 
A familiar dimension of the “constitutionalisation” of labour law is the capacity to view the 
rights of workers as human rights to be protected through human rights mechanisms 
internationally, regionally and domestically.12 The “agency” model of members-only or 
explicit consent for bargaining would seem to correspond with this human rights-based 
model. The right-holder is the individual trade union member. The collective dimension of 
the right occurs whenever a group of trade union members decide to exercise their individual 
right collectively together. Given that the human rights entitlement is vested in the individual, 
it follows that this entitlement cannot be extinguished where a trade union fails to achieve 
majority support in the bargaining unit. This would be a significant advantage in a system 
based exclusively on majority bargaining agents, where the failure to achieve majority 
support means that the possibilities for collective representation are effectively extinguished. 
 
Despite its advantages, there are three main difficulties with this model. First, it does not 
necessarily allow for the possibility that the trade union itself, as a distinct entity, might enjoy 
a group right to collective bargaining that is separate from the aggregate of individual 
members’ rights. This notion of a collective right to bargain has now been recognised under 
various constitutional instruments.13  
 
Second, this model does not provide a clear account of which correlative duties, if any, 
correspond to the right to representation. The most minimal account might conceive of this as 
simply a freedom to negotiate through a bargaining agent. In which case, it might follow that 
since this is simply a freedom, not a right, there are no correlative duties on employers. Of 
course, Hendy’s argument identifies the basic entitlement as a right to representation. This 
transcends the limitations of a simple agency model and might connect to the bargaining “in 
good faith”, which Anderson identified as vital to any success of the New Zealand system of 
                                                          
12 As discussed by Judy Fudge, “Constitutionalizing Labour Rights in Canada and Europe: 
Freedom of Association, Collective Bargaining, and Strikes” (2015) 68(1) Current Legal 
Problems 267. 
13 See for example the South African Constitution 1996, Article 23(4) and (5).  
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industrial relations.14 It still leaves unresolved however whether correlative duties escalate 
where these individual rights are exercised collectively, for example allowing for the scope to 
extend collective bargaining coverage to a minority of non-trade union members.   
 
Finally, in many human rights instruments there is an important principle of effective legal 
protection that shapes the implementation of human rights guarantees. For example, under the 
ECHR the Court has stated that “the aim of the Convention is to guarantee not rights that are 
theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective”.15 In a system of members-
only bargaining, where bargaining arrangements are so fragmented as to provide a weak 
system of worker representation, this may constitute a failure to ensure that worker 
representation arrangements “are practical and effective”.  
 
It is notable that these provisions in the 1966 Covenants are expressly linked to ILO 
Convention No. 87, which is to take precedence in terms of State obligations.16 The 
difficulty, perhaps, with the latter ILO Convention is that trade union recognition falls 
somewhere between Article 2, which again sets out the bare entitlement of workers to form 
and join trade unions and Article 3 which enables workers to ‘organise their administration 
and activities and to formulate their programmes’. In this sense, ILO Convention No. 98 
offers a vital supplement to these modest statements of basic human rights to place an 
obligation on States to promote collective bargaining. Here Article 4 is vital, which states 
that: “Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to 
encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary 
negotiation between employers or employers' organisations and workers' organisations, with 
a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective 
agreements.”17 At this point, we have arguably moved beyond the individual entitlement 
model. Where there is State responsibility to ensure that collective bargaining is promoted, 
this requires that members-only arrangements be supplemented by other forms of positive 
legal support for trade union representation.  
 
                                                          
14 As discussed in Anderson and Nuttall, n.3 above.  
15 Artico v Italy (1981) 3 EHRR 1, para 33. 
16 See ICCPR, Art.22(3) and ICESCR, Art. 8(3).  
17 Indeed, it would seem to be from Convention No. 98 that Article 23(4) and (5) of the South 
African Constitution are derived.  
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A democratic claim to representation 
 
In arguing for a democratic right to representation, one is seeking to overcome the objection 
that, while a person has a human right to join a trade union, the ability of that union to request 
that an employer engages in collective bargaining is subject to limitations. In particular, the 
worker’s right can be viewed as being limited by (inter alia) the rights and freedoms of the 
employer, the latter being ‘necessary in a democratic society’ (as set out in Article 8 of the 
ICESCR and Article 11(2) of the ECHR). In this context, employers have sought to argue 
that they have the right not to be a trade union member and a right not to engage in collective 
bargaining.18 The counter-argument is that where the workers’ desire to be so represented is 
itself collectively determined and democratic in nature it offers a powerful reason for state-
supported “recognition”. In both an Australian and British context, legislative intervention 
has given weight to this understanding of recognition as a democratic claim. However, 
concerns remain as to their operation: from the ways in which numbers are tallied (is this 
genuine “democracy”?),19 to the scope of obligations (after recognition) to bargain in good 
faith.20  
 
The legislative scheme in the UK reflects the general structure and normative orientation of 
the US Wagner Act model.21 It empowers a specialist agency, the Central Arbitration 
Committee (CAC), to determine the bargaining unit and measure worker support within that 
bargaining unit. The CAC must impose (absent a voluntarily agreed method) a legally 
                                                          
18 For example, Young, James and Webster v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 38; and Gustafsson v. 
Sweden (1996) 22 EHRR 409. See Tonia Novitz, “Negative Freedom of Association” (1997) 
26 ILJ 79; see also Virginia Mantouvalou, “Is there a Human Right Not to Be a Trade Union 
Member?” in Colin Fenwick and Tonia Novitz (eds) Human Rights at Work – Perspectives 
on Law and Regulation (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010). For a more recent illustration, see 
Janus v American Federation of State County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 et al 
United States Supreme Court judgment delivered 27 June 2018, available at: 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf. The majority judgment 
effectively abolishes “agency fees” paid by non-members for union-led improvement in their 
terms and conditions, which was fixed at approximately 78% of full union dues, overturning 
a forty year precedent. See the dissenting judgment of Justice Kagan, with whom Justice 
Ginsberg and Justice Sotomayer joined.    
19 Bogg n.7 above, at ch 5 and 7. 
20 Anthony Forsyth and Sara Slinn, “Promoting Worker Voice through Good Faith 
Bargaining Laws: The Canadian and Australian Experience” in Bogg and Novitz (eds) n.3 
above. Cf. Anderson n.2 above.  
21 See the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, Schedule A1.  
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binding bargaining procedure agreement upon the parties in a situation of majority worker 
support for the union’s recognition claim. This mechanism is based upon a conception of 
representational legitimacy that collective bargaining rights are legitimated through the 
collective majoritarian consent of workers. In simple terms, workers get collective bargaining 
only if this is what workers want, and the state remains neutral as to those preferences. 
Collective consent is determined by a process of preference aggregation. This usually occurs 
through a formal ballot, although it is still possible in the UK for majority support to be 
confirmed through trade union membership levels in the bargaining unit. Where the union 
achieves majority support, “democratic” models of union recognition generally confer 
exclusive representative status on that union in respect of the bargaining unit. 
 
In the UK, at least, human rights jurisprudence under Article 11 of the ECHR has provided 
some modest support to the statutory recognition model. In Wilson v UK, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that UK law had violated Article 11 because “it was open to 
the employers to seek to pre-empt any protest on the part of the unions or their members 
against the imposition of limits on voluntary collective bargaining, by offering those 
employees who acquiesced in the termination of collective bargaining substantial pay rises, 
which were not provided to those who refused to sign contracts accepting the end of union 
representation”.22 As such, the UK government was under an obligation to introduce 
measures to protect trade unionists from the use of financial inducements which interfered 
with the Article 11 rights of individual workers and the trade union itself. Such intervention 
would provide an important prop to the bargaining activities of an exclusive bargaining agent, 
by supporting the “normative effect” of collectively agreed norms in the bargaining unit. 
 
Wilson v UK was an important staging-post in the evolution of a progressive Article 11 
jurisprudence. At this stage, the court stopped short of recognizing a right to collective 
bargaining as an essential element of Article 11.23 In the landmark decision in Demir and 
Baykara v Turkey,24 the Court finally recognized the right to collective bargaining as a 
fundamental element of Article 11. In the course of so doing, the Court observed that this 
recognition was in the context of “it being understood that States remain free to organise their 
                                                          
22 Wilson and the NUJ v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 20, para 47. 
23 Ibid., para. 44. 
24 Demir and Baykara v Turkey App 34503/97, 12 November 2008. See Keith Ewing and 
John Hendy, “The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara” (2010) 39 ILJ 2. 
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system so as, if appropriate, to grant special status to representative trade unions”.25 This 
opened up permissive space under Article 11 for a statutory system that conferred preferential 
bargaining rights, correlative to bargaining duties, on majoritarian bargaining representatives, 
so as to comply with obligations under ILO Convention No. 98. 
 
Public governance 
 
As we have seen, proposals for sectoral arrangements now form part of a progressive agenda 
for collective bargaining reforms in New Zealand and the United Kingdom. It is worthwhile 
to reflect upon the position of such arrangements from the perspective of human rights 
jurisprudence. As Ewing and Hendy have pointed out in their recent reflections on sectoral 
collective bargaining, sectoral arrangements were effectively blocked in the US because of 
constitutional objections.26 This was because the achievement of binding normative effect for 
sectoral codes, secured through a Presidential order, gave these codes the status of law. This 
was constitutionally objectionable because law-making authority had been allocated to 
Congress under the US constitution. Ewing and Hendy also point to recent jurisprudence in 
Ireland where similar constitutional objections were levelled against sectoral arrangements.27  
This is an important reminder that human rights, understood as legal entitlements in the hands 
of courts, can sometimes obstruct the realization of progressive political agendas. 
 
Given the prevalence of sectoral bargaining in Europe, Article 11 is unlikely to be interpreted 
by the ECtHR so as to undermine sectoral arrangements. There is not a single 
constitutionalised template for the right to collective bargaining. Rather, the right will take 
shape in a variety of ways across different constitutional orders. Nevertheless, we think that 
there are three potential difficulties in reconciling a constitutionalised right to collective 
bargaining with sectoral arrangements. 
 
First, Article 11 has operated as a weak constraint on the deregulation of sectoral 
arrangements in the UK. In Unite v United Kingdom,28 the ECtHR considered that the 
abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board did not constitute an interference with the right to 
                                                          
25 Demir and Baykara v Turkey App 34503/97, 12 November 2008, para 154. 
26 Ewing and Hendy n.6 above, at 32. 
27 Ibid., at 32.  
28 Unite the Union v United Kingdom App No 65397/13, 3 May 2016. 
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collective bargaining under Article 11. Accordingly, the application was rejected as 
manifestly ill-founded. The abolition of the sectoral scheme was within the state’s margin of 
appreciation. The ECtHR regarded it as significant that other mechanisms for securing 
recognition existed, such as industrial action or the statutory recognition procedure. Given 
that in agriculture the vast majority of employers fail to meet the stipulated threshold of 
employing at least 21 workers, the statutory recognition procedure is in practice unavailable 
within the agricultural sector. In addition, the dispersed and often precarious nature of 
employment in the sector rendered it highly unlikely that groups of co-workers would be able 
to secure recognition through a credible threat of strike action. Indeed, it is these very reasons 
that provided the rationale for a protective sectoral regime. 
 
Second, in order for sectoral institutions to operate effectively, it is necessary that trade 
unions can organize strike action on a sectoral basis. This would require some latitude for 
trade unions to organize “secondary” industrial action. In UK law, the statutory immunity for 
strike action is withdrawn in circumstances of “secondary” action. This leaves the trade union 
exposed to liability in tort, and it exposes individual strikers to a greater risk of lawful 
dismissal for participating in strike action. The ban on secondary action was challenged in 
RMT v United Kingdom.29 The ECtHR rejected the application as inadmissible, on the basis 
that the domestic ban was justified under Article 11 and within the state’s margin of 
appreciation.  
 
Both decisions demonstrate that Article 11 may be impotent in the face of legislative action 
hostile to sectoral arrangements. The third possibility is that constitutional freedom of 
association norms might themselves be presented as a constitutional barrier to sectoral 
arrangements. We have already seen this phenomenon in the US and Irish contexts. In the 
recent Canadian case of Mounted Police Association of Toronto v Canada,30 the Supreme 
Court of Canada concluded that a statutorily imposed non-independent representative body 
constituted a “substantial interference” with employees’ freedom of association. In its 
reasoning, the SCC referred to the significance of “choice” in assessing the constitutional 
propriety of labour relations arrangements, namely “the ability to have effective input into the 
                                                          
29 The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) v the UK App 
31045/10, 8 April 2014; see also Alan Bogg and Keith Ewing, “The Implications of the RMT 
Case” (2014) 43 ILJ 221. 
30 Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 3. 
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selection of collective goals to be advanced by their association”.31 It is important to 
emphasise that this decision was crafted within the specific context of the Canadian 
constitution. Nevertheless, the constitutionalisation of “choice” as a normative principle 
seems to be aligned with a “democratic mandate” model of union recognition and even 
collective action.32 Since representational legitimacy extends beyond “choice” in sectoral 
arrangements, such a principle could create constitutional difficulties for sectoral collective 
bargaining. 
 
3. Separate histories: some starting points for comparison 
 
Our experience of the “Voices at Work” project, on which we were engaged with Gordon 
Anderson as one of our research partners, has made us wary of crude comparisons between 
different national industrial relations systems.33 We do not pretend that trade union 
recognition has ever meant the same in the British and New Zealand systems. Rather, both 
can be understood as shaped by their respective histories.  
 
The British trade union recognition system operates against the background of “collective 
laissez-faire” bargaining and unsuccessful experimentation with forms of State intervention 
in the 1970s. Whereas, the New Zealand system is deeply rooted in extensive State 
intervention in the apparatus for collective bargaining, a thirty year rejection of that model 
which has proved unsuccessful and a new determination to experiment with combinations of 
past approaches which benefit working people.         
 
From collective laissez-faire to “democratic” trade union recognition in the United Kingdom 
 
The UK has, in industrial relations terms, followed its own distinctive trajectory towards 
recognition of organised labour and scope for collective bargaining. Historically, the UK 
                                                          
31 Ibid., para 86. 
32 See for comparison of the “democratic” rationales for UK rules on majority voting for 
statutory trade union recognition and the ability to take industrial action in “important public 
services” (namely approval by 40% of those eligible to vote), see Tonia Novitz, “UK 
Regulation of Strike Ballots and Notices – Moving Beyond ‘Democracy’?” (2016) 29 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 226.  
33 See for an overview of the project (2011 – 2014), Alan Bogg and Tonia Novitz “Purposes 
and Techniques of Voice: Prospects for Continuity and Change” in Bogg and Novitz n.3 
above, especially at 5.   
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system was based upon the theory and practice of “collective laissez-faire”. This eschewed a 
reliance on “direct” methods of legal enforcement, such as a legal duty to bargain. Instead, 
collective bargaining was promoted through a variety of “indirect” (or auxiliary) methods 
such as institution-building through administrative law, fair wages resolutions and public 
contract compliance, extension mechanisms for collective agreements, compulsory 
arbitration, and sectoral wages councils.34 
 
The first legislative experiment in “direct” trade union recognition was implemented in the 
ill-fated Industrial Relations Act 1971. This legislation offered trade unions certain new 
forms of statutory protection and promotion of their interests, but in exchange for 
registration, which entailed a highly juridified restriction of their freedom to undertake strike 
action. The recognition procedure was short-lived. The entire legislative framework was 
rendered unworkable by a concerted campaign of non-registration by most British trade 
unions. The second legislative experiment in statutory recognition was implemented in the 
Employment Protection Act 1975 and was administered by the Advisory, Conciliation, and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS). This procedure also ended after a brief and unhappy life, but for 
different reasons. The low point was reached in Grunwick v ACAS where the employer had 
refused to cooperate with either the trade union or ACAS in a disputed recognition case. The 
House of Lords considered that ACAS could not recommend recognition without a full 
investigation, even when the reason for the lack of such an investigation was obstruction by 
the employer motivated by bitter employer hostility to the unionization of the workforce.35 In 
fact, a series of damaging judicial review cases had impeded the discretionary work of ACAS 
to such an extent that the legislation became very difficult to administer.36 
 
The current statutory procedure is set down in Schedule A1 TULRCA 1992 and has been in 
operation since 2000. In its most recent annual report, the CAC indicated that there had been 
only 51 applications for trade union recognition in 2016-17, a figure which has remained 
relatively steady in recent years.37 The impact of Schedule A1 has therefore been rather 
                                                          
34 See Bogg n.7 above, ch. 1.  
35 [1978] ICR 231. 
36 Discussed in Bogg and Novitz, n.7 above.  
37 See the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) Annual Report 2016-17 available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/629689/CAC_Annual_Report_2016-17.pdf.  
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marginal, both in respect of union recognition secured directly under the legislation and union 
recognition secured through “voluntary” means.38  
 
We think that there are several reasons for this pattern. One, which emerged in respect of the 
controversy over the abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board, is the requirement that there 
be a 21 worker threshold for the statutory system to apply.39 There is also the point made 
powerfully by Anne Davies that part time workers only count as “half” under this system, so 
that the threshold may be even more difficult to meet. Further, the very threshold of “worker” 
is currently difficult to satisfy in the context of the “gig” economy, so that substitution 
clauses inserted unilaterally by the putative employer into couriers’ contracts were able to 
defeat a claim for statutory recognition.40 Moreover, “the winner takes it all”, with there 
being no scope for members only bargaining orders or for an individual to insist on being 
represented by a trade union where the union fails to secure a majority. There is a problem of 
a simple “non-union default”,41 exacerbated by significant limitations on the “unfair practice” 
constraints set out in the legislation.  
 
The domestic courts have sometimes used Article 11 of the ECHR to provide a purposive 
construction of certain elements of the statutory scheme. For example, in Netjets 
Management Limited v Central Arbitration Committee & Anor the High Court considered the 
appropriate interpretation of the legislation’s territorial jurisdiction by reference to Article 11. 
In this respect, Supperstone J. observed that: “The reality is that if the Union cannot bargain 
collectively with the Claimant in relation to their pay, hours and holidays in Great Britain 
they will not be able to exercise their Article 11 right.”42 In Wandsworth London Borough 
                                                          
38 See Gregor Gall, “Statutory Regulation and Employment Relations: The Impact of 
Statutory Trade Union Recognition” (2014) 43 ILJ 218.   
39 See text accompanying n.28 above. See further A.C.L. Davies, “’Half a Person’: A Legal 
Perspective on Organizing and Representing Non-Standard Workers” in Bogg and Novitz 
(eds) n.3 above, at 122.  
40 Independent Workers’ Union of Great Britain (IGWB) and RooFoods Limited TA/ 
Deliveroo, Central Arbitration Committee 14 November 2017 (TUR1/985(2016)). 
41 Cf. the proposals in Mark Harcourt, Gregor Gall, Rinu Vimal Kumar, Richard Croucher, 
“A Union Default: A Policy to Raise Union Membership, Promote the Freedom to Associate, 
Protect the Freedom not to Associate and Progress Union Representation” (2018) ILJ 
advance access, available at: https://academic.oup.com/ilj/advance-
article/doi/10.1093/indlaw/dwy005/5040332?searchresult=1.  
42 Netjets Management Ltd v Central Arbitration Committee and another [2012] EWHC 
2685, para 42. 
15 
 
Council v Vining and Others, the exclusion of “parks officers” from the scope of the statutory 
redundancy consultation scheme was regarded as a violation of theirs and their union’s 
Article 11 rights. Such exclusions from statutory schemes required a justification, and no 
justification had been offered on the facts of the case.43 This might have a wider significance 
for the appeal currently being brought on behalf of gig economy workers. 
 
However, the Court of Appeal in Pharmacists’ Defence Association Union v Boots 
Management Services Ltd declined to issue a “declaration of incompatibility” in a situation 
where the employer had recognised a non-independent trade union which blocked the 
statutory application of a competing independent trade union.44 The Court of Appeal took the 
view that it was sufficient that an individual worker could petition for a derecognition ballot 
under the legislation, and that the detailed implementation of the “right to recognition” was a 
matter for the legislature. Overall, the role of Article 11 in relation to the UK statutory 
scheme might be described as ‘mostly harmless’.45 It has sometimes provided modest 
purposive support to the statutory scheme at the margins. More significantly, perhaps, Article 
11 has not been used by the courts to frustrate the statutory scheme, in the manner of the 
English courts under the 1975 statutory recognition scheme in the UK.46 
  
As matters stand (in the midst of this complex statutory and rights-based matrix), the rate of 
British unionization and collective bargaining coverage is in decline. Union membership has 
fallen from a peak of 65% (approximately 13 million employees) in 1980 to 23.5% in 2016 
(approximately 6.2 million employees). There has been a decrease of 8.9% even since 1995.47 
Membership is eroding in both the private and public sectors. In the private sector, 
membership declined in 2015-16 for the first time in 6 years and stands only at 13.4%, while 
in the public sector it is now 52.7%. In 2015-16 both declined in a way which has been 
                                                          
43 Vining v London Borough of Wandsworth [2017] EWCA Civ 1092. 
44 The Pharmacists' Defence Association Union v Boots Management Services Ltd and 
Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills [2017] EWCA Civ 66; discussed in 
Alan Bogg and Ruth Dukes, “Article 11 ECHR and the Right to Collective Bargaining: 
Pharmacists’ Defence Association Union v Boots Management Services Ltd” (2017) 46 ILJ 
543.   
45 As per Douglas Adams, A Hitchiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (Pan Books, London, 1979). 
46 See text accompanying n.36 above.  
47 Mark Cully et al, Britain at Work: As Depicted by the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey 1999. 235-42; and Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (DBEIS), 
Trade Union Membership 2016: Statistical Bulletin, 2017, 3. 
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described as “statistically significant”.48  This can be contrasted with previous growth in 
public sector trade union membership from 1995 – 2005 and stability until 2010.49 This 
correlates broadly to collective bargaining coverage, which stands in the public sector at 
57.6%, while only 15.2% of employees in the private sector had their pay and conditions 
negotiated by a union. Over the past twenty years, the percentage for the public sector has 
dropped by 16.8% and in the private sector by 8%.50 The result seems to be that rates of pay 
are lowering and terms and conditions worsening, especially in particularly vulnerable sectors 
of the economy, such as that concerned with adult social care.51 In other words, the United 
Kingdom is facing regulatory failure in various sectors of its labour market.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the result in the British Labour Party has been to propose radical reform of 
collective bargaining mechanisms. The British Institute of Employment Rights (IER - a think 
tank for policymaking linking trade unions with academic specialists in labour law and 
industrial relations) in 2016 launched A Manifesto for Labour Law, which advocated a new 
Ministry of Labour and new “machinery for the development of sector wide standards”.52 The 
Manifesto proposed that “ultimately every worker and every employer of workers in this 
country should be covered by a collective agreement concluded at sectoral level”, a call 
which follows from previous IER policy proposals and publications.53 Sectoral Employment 
Commissions set up by the Ministry of Labour would “promote collective bargaining and … 
regulate minimum terms and conditions of employment within specific industrial sectors”.54 
These proposals have been welcomed by the current British Labour Party leadership, which 
in the most recent Labour election manifesto made a commitment to create a Ministry of 
                                                          
48 DBEIS n.47 above, 3 and 6. 
49 DBEIS n.47 above at 12.  
50 https://www.statista.com/statistics/287297/collective-agreement-coverage-unions-united-
kingdom-uk-y-on-y-by-sector/.  
51 See Lydia Hayes, 8 Good Reasons Why Adult Social Care Needs Sectoral Collective 
Bargaining (IER, Liverpool, 2017), available at:  http://www.ier.org.uk/publications/8-good-
reasons-why-adult-social-care-needs-sectoral-collective-bargaining.  
52 K.D. Ewing, John Hendy and Carolyn Jones (eds), A Manifesto for Labour Law: Towards 
a Comprehensive Revision of Workers’ Rights (IER, Liverpool, 2016),  ch 3, especially at 20. 
We should add that the authors of this article are also contributors to this publication.  
53 Keith Ewing and John Hendy, Reconstruction After the Crisis: A Manifesto for Collective 
Bargaining (IER, Liverpool, 2013); Lydia Hayes and Tonia Novitz, Trade Unions and 
Economic Inequality (London/Liverpool: CLASS/IER, London/Liverpool, 2014) available at: 
http://classonline.org.uk/docs/2014_trade_unions_and_economic_inequality_-
_Hayes__Novitz.pdf. 
54 See the Manifesto n.52 above at 20 - 21.  
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Labour and “review the rules on union recognition so that more workers have the security of 
a union”.  Further, the British Labour Party would, in its “20 point plan”, “roll out sectoral 
collective bargaining – because the most effective way to maintain good rights at work is 
collectively through a union”.55 At present, however, the UK has a Conservative Government 
held in place by a precarious coalition with the Democratic Unionist Party in Northern 
Ireland.  There is accordingly no immediate prospect of implementation of these policy 
proposals and no way to know how they would fare under a human rights review by the 
domestic courts or the ECtHR.  
 
New Zealand shifts from state control to individual agency and on to sectoral bargaining? 
 
In terms of the New Zealand experience, the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration (IC&A) 
Act from 1894 onwards offered a highly regulated system of collectively negotiated “awards” 
which operated in particular sectors. IC&A therefore operated in stark contrast to British 
“collective laissez faire”, although it does not look so very dissimilar to the proposals of the 
current British Labour Party.  
 
Anderson and Nuttall have attributed the IC&A system more to New Zealand trade unions’ 
political as opposed to industrial strength.56 This was a legislative solution which aided trade 
unions when the bitter 1890 Maritime Strike ended with victory for the employers. In the UK, 
trade unions were (at least at that time) stronger and could, without State support, engage in 
significant regulation of workers’ treatment in the workplace.  
 
Initially, parties could include “union membership clauses” in awards or agreements, with a 
Labour Government introducing compulsory trade union membership in 1936 (with limited 
conscience clauses and an exception for the public service).57 Awards covered all workers in 
a particular industry, with effectively monopoly unions engaged both in representing workers 
in the IC&A system and subsequently enforcing the awards in the workplace.58 At this stage, 
                                                          
55 For the Many, Not the Few (Labour Party, London, 2017) available at: 
https://labour.org.uk/manifesto/.  
56 Anderson and Nuttall n.3 above at 195.  
57 See discussion in Tonia Novitz, “New Zealand Industrial Relations and the International 
Labour Organisation: resolving Contradictions in Freedom of Association” (1996) 21 NZ 
Journal of Industrial Relations (NZJIR) 119 at 125. 
58 Anderson and Nuttall n.3 above at 197.  
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there was almost complete trade union membership among the workforce, but the extent to 
which unions effectively represented their members was questioned by some commentators.59 
A “New” Labour Government, pursuing “Rogernomics” and what has been described as a 
“neo-liberal” economic agenda abolished compulsory arbitration60 and later introduced the 
Labour Relations Act 1987, which made provision for collective bargaining outside the 
traditional structure of awards and registered collective agreements, allowing for “enterprise” 
level bargaining at workplaces.61 Only registered trade unions with over a thousand members 
could claim the enhanced representation and negotiation rights within the national awards 
structure.62  
 
By 1991, a newly elected National Government had introduced the Employment Contracts 
Act, which entirely abolished the past system of union registration alongside any remnants of 
the IC&A system. Instead, workers and their employers could authorise “bargaining agents” 
(who could be any person or organisation) to conclude employment contracts on their behalf, 
whether individual or collective. Notably, even established trade unions would not 
necessarily constitute workers’ bargaining agents, regardless of historical patterns of 
representation. The number of workers covered by a collective agreement dropped swiftly 
(by approximately 45%).63 While the Employment Relations Act 2000 was introduced to 
ameliorate that damage, the agency model for union representation remains much the same 
and collective bargaining coverage has never recovered.64  
 
The 2000 legislation introduced a duty to deal with “good faith”65 and the sole right of trade 
unions to negotiate collective employment contracts for their members.66 Further, while there 
is no obligation to enter into a collective agreement or agree on any matter for inclusion in a 
                                                          
59 Ibid., citing Martin Gross, “The Condition of New Zealand Trade Unions” [1961] NZ J of 
Public Administration 28; and Noel Woods, “Comments on the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1894” (1994) 19 NZJIR 225.  
60 Anderson and Nuttall n.3 at 198 citing the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1984.  
61 Novitz n.57 at 127.  
62 Labour Relations Act 1987, s. 6. 
63 Novitz n.57 at 129. 
64 Pam Nuttall, “Collective Bargaining and Good Faith Obligations in New Zealand” in 
Creighton and Forsyth n.7 above, at 292. 
65 Employment Relations Act 2000, s. 4 and s.32.  
66 Employment Relations Act 2000, s. 40. 
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collective agreement, an employer will not comply with their “good faith” obligations if they 
refuse to enter into a collective agreement “because the employer is opposed, or objects in 
principle, to bargaining for or being a party to a collective agreement”.67 In such 
circumstances, the New Zealand Employment Relations Authority may impose all or part of a 
first contract.68 
 
A procedure introduced in 2004 looks less like an exercise of the individual right to trade 
union representation and more like a UK “democratic” mechanism. It applies where there is 
either “one union proposing to initiate bargaining with two or more employers for a single 
collective agreement”, or “two or more unions proposing to initiate bargaining with one or 
more employers for a single collective agreement”.69 This has enabled an employer and union 
to conduct a joint ballot of non-unionised employees, prior to any collective agreement 
coming into force, to see if non-union members would be prepared to pay the “bargaining 
fee” to make the union their agent and be covered by the collectively negotiate terms. If there 
is majority support in the ballot, then all non-union members can come within the coverage 
clause of the collective agreement, unless an individual chooses on a personal basis not to pay 
the bargaining fee.70 An employer cannot “undermine” the collective agreement by passing 
on identical terms to non-union members otherwise.  
 
It should be observed that “collective employment agreements” are legally binding in a very 
different way to the UK, where the norm is for only those terms “incorporated” into 
individual employment contracts to be legally enforceable.71 Also, under the 2000 
Employment Relations Act, anyone who joins a union automatically joins the corresponding 
collective agreement that covers his or her work.72 
 
However, the legislative changes since 1991 have not led to notably enhanced outcomes. 
New Zealand continues to have one of the lowest rates of collective bargaining coverage in 
                                                          
67 Employment Relations Act 2000 (as amended), s. 33.  
68 Employment Relations Act 2000 (as amended), s. 50J, as discussed by Harcourt et al n. 41 
above, at 24.  
69 Employment Relations Act 2000 (as amended), s.45 et seq.  
70 See Employment Relations Act 2000, s. 69P; discussed by Nuttall n. 64 above, at 304. 
71 TULRCA 1992, s. 179; see also Ford Motor Co v. AUEW [1969] 2 QB 303 and on 
“aptness for incorporation” Malone & Ors v British Airways plc [2011] IRLR 32.  
72 Employment Relations Act 2000, s. 18 and 56, as discussed by Harcourt et al n.41 above, 
at 23. 
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the OECD at under 20%, with links to lower wages and higher income inequality.73 Like the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand has witnessed in the 2010 “Hobbit legislation” the systemic 
and arguably even more deliberate exclusion of certain persons from “worker” status and, 
thereby, collective bargaining rights.74  
 
However, changes are taking place. In April 2017, the then Prime Minister Bill English (with 
cross-party support) announced a $2 billion pay equity settlement for care and support 
workers in New Zealand aged and disability residential care and community support services. 
A new pay scale was introduced in the sector which raised the minimum wage from $15.75 
per hour to $19 per hour – a 21% rise.75 This addresses concerns in a vulnerable employment 
sector noticed also in the UK.76  The new Coalition Government in New Zealand (led by 
Jacinda Ardern) has indicated that this Care and Support Workers Settlement should be 
regarded as the beginning of a roll out of Fair Pay Agreements on a sectoral level.77 A Fair 
Work Agreements team representing various aspects of the political spectrum and diverse 
industrial and expert actors has been established to carry the plan forward.78 In response, the 
Opposition, the  National Party (along with BusinessNZ) say that when back in office they 
will abolish Fair Pay Agreements, since they will take NZ back to sectoral strikes,79 (although 
of course what we know of the awards system is that they managed to suppress strikes for a 
                                                          
73 Submission of the NZCTU on the Employment Relations Amendment Bill 2018, 30 March 
2018, at 13, available at: https://www.union.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/NZCTU-
Employment-Relations-Amendment-Bill-2018-Final.pdf. See also the OECD statistics which 
says that the number of employees in New Zealand with the right to bargain in 2016 lay at 
16%: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CBC.  
74 See the Employment Relations (Film Production Work) Amendment Act 2010 discussed in 
Bernard Walker and Rupert Tipples, “The Hobbit Affair: A New Frontier For Unions?” 
(2013) Adelaide Law Review 65. See also Pam Nuttall, “’… Where the Shadows Lie’: 
Confusion, Misunderstanding, and Misinformation about Workplace Status’ (2011) 36 New 
Zealand Journal of Employment Relations (NZJER) 73; and Margaret Wilson, 
“Constitutional Implications of ‘The Hobbit’ Legislation” (2011) 36 NZJER 91. 
75 See for the text of the agreement: http://www.etu.nz/resources/care-and-support-workers-
pay-equity-settlement-agreement/ signed 1 July 2017; and for media comment: 
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11840364.  
76 See Hayes n.51 above.  
77 See Doug Martin, “Fair Pay Agreements — Issues and challenges for a new wave of 
collective bargaining” available at: https://medium.com/from-the-exosphere/fair-pay-
agreements-issues-and-challenges-for-a-new-wave-of-collective-bargaining-f5fe760a051e.  
78 https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government%E2%80%99s-fair-pay-agreement-work-
begin.  
79 https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2018/06/national-promises-to-scrap-
government-s-fair-pay-agreements-working-group.html.  
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considerable period). Indeed, it is already contemplated that strikes will not be permitted in 
respect of such agreements.80 Arguably, this new policy stance takes New Zealand beyond a 
human rights or “representational” collective bargaining framework as issues of “regulatory” 
efficacy become more relevant.  
 
Further, we note that, at the time of writing, amendment of the “Hobbit law” is anticipated, 
such that the right to engage in collective negotiations will be restored. Again, a working 
group (including a variety of social actors including BusinessNZ and the Council of Trade 
Unions) has been formed to recommend changes that balance film industry and workers’ 
protections.81 This suggests a shift to enabling broader collective bargaining coverage for 
non-standard work, which does have a flavour of the human right to be represented by a trade 
union.  
 
4. Final reflections on the “virtuous circle” between representational and 
regulatory bargaining models and the nature of “constitutionalisation” 
 
We wish to conclude by stressing that there is no necessity to choose between 
“representational” or “regulatory” bargaining models. Indeed, we believe that there are 
significant advantages in a democratic system of collective bargaining that provides 
simultaneous support to enterprise and sectoral bargaining. In this respect, we agree with 
Ewing and Hendy that “the extension of collective bargaining is not simply about the 
expansion of horizontal measures for sectoral standard setting, but also for simultaneously 
deepening vertical enterprise-based trade union activity, vertical in the sense that the trade 
union role should be embedded from the cloakroom to the boardroom. The two (the 
horizontal and the vertical) should be highly integrated.”82 Rather, we think that this multi-
level approach can create a “virtuous circle” of solidaristic practices. Strong union 
organisation in the enterprise provides legitimacy and support to the maintenance of sectoral 
bargaining. Strong sectoral bargaining reduces the scope for employers to challenge the 
legitimacy of enterprise-based unionism, and it reduces the economic incentives for union 
exclusion and avoidance. It might therefore be possible to marry regulatory sectoral 
                                                          
80 https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12064964.  
81 https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2018/01/29/78965/the-hobbit-law-there-and-back-again.  
82 Ewing and Hendy n.6 above, at 42. 
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bargaining with majoritarian recognition in enterprise bargaining, as well as agency options 
for multi-union workplaces where otherwise recognition would be unavailable.  
 
The achievement of this “virtuous circle” requires patient work to ensure that these 
bargaining arrangements are effectively aligned and efficiently coordinated. Still, the matter 
of effective coordination is not solely a matter of regulatory design. We should acknowledge 
that there are two potential sources of normative friction between “representational” and 
“regulatory” bargaining in any integrated system. The first lies in the role and function of 
democratic arguments; and the second lies in the facilitative or obstructive role of a 
constitutionalised human rights frame. 
 
From the perspective of “democracy”, in “representational” bargaining the principal 
normative focus is on ensuring that the bargaining representative has democratic legitimacy. 
Discussions are directed at the nature of the consent or balloting mechanisms, the 
specification of support thresholds, the circumstances in which ballots might be dispensed 
with, alternative methods for gauging majority support, and so forth.  
 
For “regulatory” bargaining, by contrast, legitimacy requires a wider consideration of the 
performance outcomes of governance arrangements. This has been described as 
“performance legitimacy” in Neil Walker’s rich account of governance legitimacy. 
“Performance legitimacy” is focused upon the ability of governance processes to deliver good 
policy outcomes.83 This would require a consideration the objective qualities and 
characteristics of the representative organization and its ability to perform an effective role in 
the formulation and implementation of policy goals. Veneziani for example identifies “the 
scope of the union’s professional constituency, its affiliation to a national union and its 
functional and structural suitability”.84 This assessment of the organization’s attributes from 
the perspective of “performance legitimacy” encompasses a multiplicity of factors that might 
                                                          
83 Neil Walker, “The White Paper in Constitutional Context” in Christian Joerges, Yves 
Meny and Joseph Weiler (eds), Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the 
Commission White Paper on Governance published as Jean Monnet Working Paper No 6/01, 
RSC, 2001; discussed in Tonia Novitz and Phil Syrpis, “Assessing Legitimate Structures for 
the Making of Transnational Labour Law: The durability of corporatism”(2006) 35 ILJ 367 at 
369-370; and Alan Bogg, “The Death of Statutory Union Recognition in the UK” (2012) 
54(3) Australian Journal of Industrial Relations 409 at 417-418. 
84 Veneziani (1999) n.8 above, at 129. 
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include: financial resources; research capacities to gather and interpret relevant economic 
data; integration with national and transnational trade union confederations; organizational 
independence from employers; a history of bargaining in a particular sector, indicating 
suitability and special expertise; and effective internal participatory structures to facilitate the 
democratic input of members. All these factors provide an indication of the trade union’s 
actual bargaining capabilities, namely the capacity to make a genuine difference which adds 
value to workers’ agreed terms and conditions. 
 
Secondly, we may wish to reflect on the role of constitutionalised rights in facilitating or 
impeding bargaining structures.  Constitutional jurisprudence in Canada and under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has undergone a transformation following 
the constitutional recognition of the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike under 
the Canadian Charter and the ECHR.85 These rights are now treated as protected under 
general freedom of association guarantees in the constitutional document. On the face of it, a 
jurisdiction like New Zealand might appear to be at a distinct disadvantage in missing out on 
this constitutional wave. However, we have seen that in the United Kingdom as elsewhere, 
constitutional rights have operated sometimes as impediments to the wider ambit of trade 
union organisation, as indeed they have done in other judicial contexts. This is no more than a 
recognition that constitutionalised labour rights, protected through constitutional courts, 
sometimes bring losses as well as gains for working people. We might also wish to remember 
that “constitutionalisation”, just like “democracy”, can be understood in a multiplicity of 
ways.  
 
Ruth Dukes has described the “constitutional function” of labour law as harnessing law “to 
institute, or recognize, a system of workers’ councils and bi-partite industrial councils, and to 
confirm the continued existence of the trade unions and employers’ associations”.86 In so 
doing, she conceives of constitutionalisation in terms of institutions, constitutional structures 
for worker participation, and democratic outcomes. In this respect, she eschews a narrow 
                                                          
85 See Fudge n.12 above.  
86 Ruth Dukes, “Hugo Sinzheimer and the Constitutional Function of Labour Law” in Guy 
Davidov and Brian Langille  (eds), The Idea of Labour Law (OUP, Oxford, 2011), 62. See 
also Ruth Dukes, The Labour Constitution: The Enduring Idea of Labour Law (OUP, Oxford, 
2014).  
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preoccupation with juridical form focused on fundamental rights guarantees in a written 
constitution.  
 
If New Zealand proposals to institute sectoral “Fair Pay Agreements” are successful, the New 
Zealand system may yet represent an exemplar of a constitutionalised and democratic system 
of labour law that produces equitable social and economic outcomes.  Paradoxically, perhaps, 
this will have been achieved in a system lacking constitutionalised labour rights in the sense 
of a legally enshrined human rights paradigm (even if this is manifested in its “agency 
model”). However, bearing in mind Dukes’ fuller sense of “constitutionalisation” in the sense 
of institutional social justice, this may indeed be achieved. This triumph of democratic 
substance over democratic form would be a fitting testament to the very same themes that 
characterize Gordon Anderson’s reflections on collective bargaining laws in New Zealand 
and beyond. 
  
 
 
